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In spite of the growing academic interest in party law in Latin America, we still lack a comprehensive account of how party regulatory frameworks evolved from the time of transitions to the present. This paper aims to fill this gap. In doing so, it makes a double contribution to the field of party regulation. On the one hand, it systematizes, for the first time, all the reforms adopted in Latin America over the last four decades. On the other hand, it introduces a theoretical innovation by using the concept of normative paradigms to analyze a process of legislative change. The main argument of this article is that a permissive paradigm was gradually but overwhelmingly replaced by a prescriptive approach, which conceives parties as semi-state institutions. This shift sheds light on the changing linkages between parties and the state in Latin America.

Fil: Scherlis, Gerardo. CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Buenos Aires, Argentina ; Fil: Scherlis, Gerardo. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentina

This article contributes to the study of party regulation in contemporary Latin America in two main ways. Firstly, it identifies a so far overlooked process by which four countries (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) raised party-formation costs in the past decade, an unprecedented process in third-wave Latin American democracies. Secondly, it offers a tentative answer to the question of why this process took place in this specific set of countries. This answer brings to the fore the issues of political parties' legitimacy and party fragmentation as sources of electoral reform. The article argues that the countries that passed these reforms are those in which the ruling political elites perceived increasing levels of fragmentation as a result of previous reforms that had opened up the political system. These prior reforms were enacted as a response to established parties' loss of legitimacy. The findings support the more general distinction between reforms initiated due to legitimacy crises and reforms resulting from changing balances of power. In this way the article also contributes to the broader debate on the factors that explain different types of electoral reforms in Latin America.

Political parties have ceased fulfilling substantial representative functions. Their legitimacy lies now on their role as governmental agencies. This led to an increasing interpenetration between parties and the states, and to the empowerment of those leaders that occupy executive offices. In the Latin American context these features are particularly intense in the case of ruling parties in countries where traditional parties collapsed or suffered significant brand dilution. In these cases the president controls the ruling party, while the «really existent» party organization is built up on the basis of networks recruited by the elected leader to run the government. The central argument of this article is that Peronism is the sole political force which has managed to adapt successfully to the conditions of electoral competition in contemporary Argentina. The president´s autonomy in terms of public policies´ in relation to a political machine sustained on the basis of the control of sub-national states makes it possible to disentangle the legitimacy of the party from that of its current national leadership. This scheme provides Peronism with a successful self-preservation mechanism, which is exceptional in the Latin American context. ; Los partidos políticos han dejado de cumplir funciones representativas significativas para legitimarse a partir de su rol como agencias de gobierno. Esto ha implicado la creciente inter- penetración entre partidos y estados, así como la concentración de recursos en los líderes que ocupan cargos ejecutivos. En el contexto latinoamericano, estas características alcanzan mayor intensidad en los partidos de gobierno de países en los que se ha producido el colapso o la dilu- ción del valor de la etiqueta de los partidos tradicionales. En estos casos, el presidente controla al partido de gobierno, mientras la estructura partidaria realmente existente se constituye sobre la base de las redes reclutadas por el líder electo para el ejercicio del gobierno.El argumento central del artículo consiste en que el peronismo es la única fuerza política que ha logrado adaptarse exitosamente a las condiciones de la competencia electoral en la Argentina contemporánea. La autonomía del presidente en términos de orientación de políticas públicas frente a una máquina partidaria sostenida sobre la base del control de los estados subnacionales hace posible escindir la legitimidad del partido respecto a la de su coyuntural liderazgo. Esto provee al peronismo de un exitoso mecanismo de preservación, excepcional en el contexto latinoamericano.

Este artículo contribuye a comprender la estructura organizativa del peronismo, la fuerza política dominante en Argentina, a partir de la observación de las designaciones partidarias en el Estado. Para ello el trabajo presenta los resultados de una investigación sobre el alcance, los mecanismos, las motivaciones y los criterios de las designaciones partidarias en el Estado federal argentino, con particular énfasis en lo ocurrido durante la presidencia de Néstor Kirchner (2003- 2007). El argumento más general sostiene que las designaciones han devenido en este período en una herramienta esencial para lograr un control efectivo sobre el aparato estatal mientras que sirven, simultáneamente, para reconfigurar las élites partidarias del peronismo bajo el liderazgo del presidente. Los datos, surgidos de una amplia serie de entrevistas a expertos, permiten finalmente ofrecer un nuevo marco teórico para estudiar el vínculo entre partido y gobierno en el contexto de la democracia argentina contemporánea. ; This article contributes to the understanding of the organizational structures of peronism, Argentine dominant political force, on the basis of a study on partisan appointments. It presents the main findings of a research on the scope, the workings, the motivations, and the criteria of partisan appointments in the Argentine state, with particular attention to Néstor Kirchner administration (2003-2007). The more general argument contends that appointments became in this period a crucial tool to control the state apparatus while, at the same time, they made it possible to renovate Peronist partisan elites under the leadership of the president. The data, obtained from a large series of expert interviews, make it possible to offer a new theoretical framework for the understanding of party-government linkages in contemporary Argentine democracy.

AbstractThis article contends that intra-party dynamics based on particularistic exchanges constitute a double-edged sword for a political system. On the one hand, they provide party leaders with strategic flexibility, which can be essential for their party stability and for the governability of the political system. On the other hand, in permitting office holders to switch policies whenever they consider fit, these dynamics render governments unpredictable and unaccountable in partisan terms, thus debasing the quality of democratic representation. The hypothesis is illustrated by recent Argentine political development.